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When Newsweek published the predictions of the top 50 political analysts for the 1948 
election, every single one of them gave the incumbent president the thumbs down. The day after 
the election President Harry S. Truman stood holding an issue of the Chicago Tribune with the 
large headline, “Dewey Defeats Truman”.  However, Truman appeared jubilant and excited.  The 
headline was wrong.  Truman was not actually defeated.  An election so close as it ran into the 
early morning, the Chicago Tribune made their title before the final results came in.  Truman had 
in fact, pulled off an amazing comeback victory. 
The blueprint to get Truman elected in his own right had to be pragmatic and crafty. 
James H. Rowe, a lawyer and strong supporter of Franklin Roosevelt’s initiatives during the New 
Deal, detailed the framework and strategy for Truman’s difficult campaign ahead. Special 
Counsel Clark Clifford added his input along with Rowe’s and delivered this memorandum, 
“The Politics of 1948”, to Truman himself.1  This critical memorandum, along with speeches 
made by Truman, private papers of the Truman administration, oral histories of those close to the 
election, and speculations from key historians unravel the puzzle that was Harry Truman’s 
extraordinary victory. 
The victory is extraordinary because of the overwhelming doubts of political experts, the 
media, and the public as a whole that Harry Truman could win the job, since his first few years 
as President saw the country hit hard economic times in the chaotic and uncertain period after 
World War II.  During this trying post-war transition, many in Truman’s Democratic Party lost 
faith in their president, looked elsewhere for a possible leader and left a ripe opportunity for the 
Republicans to win the confidence and support of the public.  The Truman team understood that 
regardless of the hit to his popularity at the time, if Truman reached out to groups that voted 
                                                          
1Stephen R. Goldzwig, Truman’s Whistle Stop Campaign, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2008)  7. 
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Democratic under Roosevelt, like organized labor and farmers, while also reaching out to 
African-Americans and Progressive voters, he would have the numbers needed to win. 
 
The Storm over Truman 
Once Truman took the oath of office after Franklin Roosevelt’s sudden death in 19452 the United 
States underwent a dramatic transformation. World War II finished only to find Truman caught 
up in the challenges of a nation recovering from a long and strenuous war effort followed by a 
new world order emerging around him.  The American public felt anxious about a housing crisis, 
increasing inflation, labor unions in protest, and shortages in consumer goods.  Truman struggled 
to pass any of his initiatives through Congress.3 Adding to these issues were two additional 
concerns that forced Democrats into soul-searching.  Growing tension with the Soviet Union 
evolved into the Cold War while a growing demand for civil rights sparked frustrations white 
voters in the South.  Both of these issues would ultimately produce ruptures in Truman’s own 
party at the worse time for the president. 4 
  Truman’s Republican opposition pounced on the American public’s frustration with the 
Democratic Party.  Many Americans by Truman’s first few years in office felt that the 
Democrats’ New Deal initiatives were an unnecessary burden now that the country had 
recovered from the Great Depression. On a more personal note, much of the country felt 
                                                          
2 Andrew E. Busch, Truman’s Triumphs: The 1948 Election and the Making of Postwar America (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 27-28. 
3 Stephen R. Goldzwig, Truman’s Whistle Stop Campaign, 5. 
4 Memo, Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman, November 19, 1947. Clifford Papers, Political File. Confidential 
Memo to the President Clifford-Rowe Memorandum. The 1948 Election Campaign Research File.  Harry S. Truman 
Library & Museum. Online. URL; https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/ 1948campaign    
/large/docs/documents/index.php?documentid=1-1&documentdate=1947-11-19&pagenumber=1. Accessed 
March 2017  
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uncertain that Truman was capable of the highest office of the land.5 The public was losing faith 
in Truman to such a point that campaigning Democratic Congressmen tried to steer clear of their 
own president during the 1946 midterms.6 In those midterm elections the Republicans ran with 
the slogan, “Had Enough? Vote Republican.”7  The American public did.  Republicans took 
away 55 seats from Democrats in the House of Representatives and a dozen seats from the 
Democrats in the Senate.   It was the first time the Republican Party controlled both Houses of 
Congress since before the 1929 Stock Market Crash.  On top of the Congressional sweep, 
Republicans added four governors to their winnings, herding most state capitols to their camp.8  
In New York Republican Thomas E. Dewey accomplished the biggest gubernatorial landslide 
victory in that state’s history, setting him up nicely for bigger ambitions soon to come.9 
 It was widely understood by Truman’s campaign team that Governor Dewey was going 
to get the Republican nod.  They also noted that the governor “will be a resourceful, intelligent, 
and highly dangerous candidate.”10  While a short man like Truman standing at 5’8’’, Dewey 
appeared more composed, relaxed, and in control than President Truman.  Born in Owosso, 
Michigan in 1902, he was also nearly two decades younger than Truman.  Achieving his law 
degree from Columbia University, Dewey quickly became a prominent district attorney in New 
York.  He first ran for governor of the state unsuccessfully at the age of 36 in 1938 only to 
rebound and win the office four years later.  His only true drawback appeared to be, of all things, 
his mustache.  Actress Ethel Barrymore remarked about Dewey’s upper lip that he appeared 
                                                          
5 Andrew E. Busch, Truman’s Triumphs: The 1948 Election and the Making of Postwar America, 20 
6 Stephen R. Goldzwig, Truman’s Whistle Stop Campaign, 6. 
7 Zachary Karabell, The Last Campaign: How Harry Truman Won the 1948 Election (New York, NY: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2000), 24. 
8 Andrew E. Busch, Truman’s Triumphs: The 1948 Election and the Making of Postwar America, 16  
9 David McCullough, Truman (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 523 
10Clifford-Rowe Memorandum. 
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“like the bridegroom on the wedding cake.”   Theodore Roosevelt’s first daughter Alice 
notoriously repeated that quip in social occasions. 11   
 The discord of Truman’s Party challenged the image of the President as a leader.  The 
issues at the forefront of this divide, racial conflicts at home and an expanding Soviet Empire 
abroad, required a leader charismatic and certain in his vision and command.  Many Democrats 
at this time thought that such a leader still needed to emerge out of the crowd and take the helm 
of the Party.  With the Cold War building, Truman stubbornly distrusted Moscow. Following the 
feedback he received for George Marshall, the president felt that diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union were pointless and that the Soviets were unwaveringly steadfast on consuming all 
of Europe.12  In what famously became the Truman Doctrine, Truman made it clear in his 
address to Congress on March 12, 1947 that the United States would play a pivotal role in 
containing Soviet ambitions in Europe13   
 The other major factor that created rupture in the Democratic Party was civil rights.  The 
plea for civil rights went neglected for decades in the United States and the numbers displayed 
the cost of that neglect for African-Americans in particular.  Between 1882 and the end of World 
War II nearly 3,500 African-Americans were lynched. Mississippi, Georgia, and Texas made up 
over a third of that total alone.14  Jim Crow laws ruled southern society dictating a “separate but 
equal” use of facilities from parks to schools to neighborhoods.15  
                                                          
11 McCullough, Truman, 670-672. 
12 McCullough, Truman,  582 
13 Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey, March 12, 1947. 
Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration. March 12, . Harry S. Truman Library & Museum.  Online. URL; 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentid=
5-9&pagenumber=1. Accessed May 2017. 
14 Lynchings by States 1882-1945.R22 [“To Secure These Rights”] [2of3]. The Department of Records and 
Research. Tuskegee Institute Alabama. Truman Library. 
15 ] “President’s Committee on Civil Rights Recommends”. President’s Committee on Civil Rights-Report 
RG 220 [“To Secure These Rights”] [2of3]. Truman Library 
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Truman’s time as president witnessed the biggest push for civil rights since Lincoln.16 In 
early February of 1948 Truman proposed major new institutions and laws to ensure greater civil 
rights such as establishing a civil rights committee under Congress, enacting a Federal Anti-
Lynching Act, and a Federal Anti-Poll Tax Act, among other initiatives.17  Truman also pushed 
for the desegregation of the military.18 These proposed progressive initiatives enraged many 
southern Democrats.  
The issues of civil rights within the U.S. and diplomatic tensions with the Soviet Union 
abroad exposed the tensions between the Democratic Party’s conservative and liberal flank. 
Neither factions of the Party were satisfied with the leadership of President Truman, and both felt 
emboldened to challenge him. The first individual to pose a threat to Harry Truman from the 
Democratic ranks came from the progressive camp of the Party.  He was Truman’s former 
Secretary of Commerce and the former Vice President, Henry Wallace.  Wallace held much 
more open and cooperative views of the Soviet Union.  In New York in 1947, Wallace made a 
controversial speech that welcomed to Moscow’s presence in other areas of Eastern Europe.  He 
declared the imperialism of close ally Great Britain to be the real threat to the world rather than 
the ideology of the Soviet Union, and argued that America’s and Great Britain’s nuclear arsenal 
be voluntarily handed over to the United Nations. Wallace then declared that his speech had been 
approved by President Truman himself.  Truman relieved Wallace as Secretary of Commerce 
                                                          
16 Karabell, The Last Campaign, 41. 
17 Revised Draft of Omnibus Civil Rights Bill, February 3, 1948. Truman Papers, Murphy Files. Civil Rights. 
Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. Online. URL; https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/ 
study_collections/civilrights/documents/index.php?documentid=9-2&pagenumber=1. Accessed May 2017. 
18 Memo "Concerning the Interpretation of the President's Order...,", ca. 1948. Record Group 220: 
Records of the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Fahy 
Committee Members and Staff. Sengstacke, John.  Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. Online. URL; 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/documents/index.php?docum
entid=5-20&documentdate=1948-00-00&pagenumber=1. Accessed April 2017. 
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eight days later. 19  Truman’s team suspected that Wallace would run as an independent 
candidate in 1948.20 While many in the Democratic Party believed Wallace to be too far to the 
left as well as too socially aloof, he none-the-less became a very well-known political figure 
among the public. Iowa born and raised, he came from a notable background as his father had 
once been the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.  He made himself not only successful but also very 
wealthy through his innovative work in hybrid corn, and served as Secretary of Agriculture 
himself under Franklin Roosevelt. 21  Wallace may not have been popular with much of the 
Democratic establishment, but he did earn great respect from President Roosevelt.  The 
President’s admiration for Wallace rose to such a height that Roosevelt threatened to not run 
again in 1940 unless the party let him put Wallace on his ticket.22  Roosevelt would give in to 
dissenting Democrats in 1944 and released Wallace from the ticket in the next election, which of 
course went to Truman.  Roosevelt then offered Wallace the position of Secretary of 
Commerce.23  After being relieved by Truman from that position Wallace did in fact announce 
himself as an independent candidate for president in 1948.24 
   Another notable dissenter was South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond, who became 
Truman’s second challenger from the Democratic Party.  Of all the Southern Democrats upset by 
Truman’s civil rights initiatives, Thurmond had shown himself to be one of the most reactionary 
and dangerous. Thurmond was complicated on race at times, in that he helped increase salaries 
for educators both black and white and in his support for the detaining of the white suspects of 
Willie Earle murder, receiving applause from the National Association for the Advancement of 
                                                          
19 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 39-40. 
20 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  
21 Zachary Karabell, The Last Campaign, 14. 
22 McCullough, Truman, 294. 
23 Karabell, The Last Campaign, 14. 
24 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 41. 
 
 
Page | 8 
Colored People.  He was nonetheless vehemently opposed to civil rights and turned into a bitter 
critic of Truman.  Thurmond would lead the Dixiecrat Party, or the States Rights Democratic 
Party as it was formally known, in the 1948 election against Truman.  While only strong in the 
South, Thurmond—in combination with Wallace—threatened to steal enough electorates away 
from Truman to win the election.25 
 
The Strategy 
Considering the realities Truman was up against, James Rowe with Clark Clifford composed 
their political memorandum in November of 1947 to prepare Truman for the long haul ahead.  
The memorandum laid out the political challenges that stood before the President. 
Acknowledging the foremost importance that standards of living for voters, Rowe and Clifford 
felt that “The High Cost of Living will be the most controversial issue of the 1948 campaign—
indeed the only domestic issue.”  The Memorandum carried on that “Whichever Party is 
adjudged guilty of causing it will lose the election.”  It stated also that Truman needed to present 
legislation to curb inflation to appear as the man to fix the problem rather than just the man 
pointing the finger across the aisle.  It did not matter if the written legislation could not appeal to 
bipartisan cooperation with Republicans. They were likely to vote against anything Truman put 
forth on an election year anyhow.  The legislation just had to appeal to the common American.   
If the legislation did not pass through the Republican dominated Congress, which it likely would 
not, Truman could use this as an attack on Republicans in the campaign.  
The Memo sought to maintain unity of Democratic voters coming from different regions 
and social backgrounds.  It described the Democratic Party as a collection of “three misfit groups” 
                                                          
25 Karabell, The Last Campaign, 42-44. 
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that the President needed to hold on.  Notably first were the conservative Democrats in the 
South.26 Southern Democrats lost much enthusiasm with Truman after he addressed the National 
Association of the Advancement of Colored People in person in mid-summer of 1947.27  Not 
only was Truman the first president to speak before the NAACP, his speech addressed racial 
concerns so genuinely some saw it as the “most forthright speech on race relations ever made by 
a president in modern times.”28 Governor Strom Thurmond stood as the prominent figure for the 
upset Southern branch of the Party ready to lock horns with the President.29 Thurmond remained 
loyal to Franklin Roosevelt when he spoke of the need for greater civil rights for African-
Americans.  With Harry Truman though, it was different.  When Truman addressed civil rights in 
Thurmond’s view, he “really means it.”30  
Constituents out in the Western United States were another of the Democratic “misfits” 
about which the reelection team were concerned, and in the eyes of the authors the “Number One 
Priority”.  The authors saw the Western states as a hotbed for progressivism and prominent 
among Western voters were issues of care and protection for the land.  They needed assurance 
that the Federal Government would provide aid after natural disasters like flooding, back 
measures for land reclamation, and support farmers and their crops throughout the region.  
Clifford and Rowe also noted that Westerners felt uneasy about the powerful influence of 
industry and big business boasted by the East Coast.31 The President understood from this aspect 
that individuals out West wanted to build up their own industry and achieve greater 
                                                          
26 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  
27 White, Phillip. Whistle Stop: How 31,000 Miles of Train Travel, 352 Speeches, and a Little Midwest 
Gumption Save The Presidency of Harry Truman. (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2014), 20. 
28 “Truman’s Speech Makes History”. RG 220 Truman’s Speeches [newspaper clippings]. The Call (K.C.-
black newspaper). July 4, 1947. 
29 White. Whistle Stop, 20. 
30 Words from Strom Thurmond to journalist quoted in Truman’s Memoirs.  Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by 
Harry S. Truman; Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 183. 
31 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  
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independence from East Coast manufacturers and businesses.32  Much in line with the distrust of 
Eastern big businesses, Western states seemed intrigued by the progressive measures of Henry 
Wallace. This included his no holds barred aggression towards Wall Street and financial elites.  
Wallace also posed a threat of gaining support from younger progressive voters “because he 
dared talk in an idealistic strain” when he visited Western states in the past.33   Clifford and 
Rowe noticed that allies of Wallace were already setting the groundwork for him to make 
headway in the West, making the Western States vital for Truman. 
Another critical group that fell outside of Clifford and Rowe’s Democratic “three misfits” 
but shared with the Western constituents the title of “Number One Priority” were the farmers.  
The memo noted that farmers were Republican by custom but that under Democratic leadership 
in recent years they had prospered.  Truman’s Marshall Plan garnered more support from 
agricultural interests.  Clifford and Rowe felt that the President had already supplied the policies 
to earn the farmer vote, but they still worried that financial security may persuade farmers to 
back the GOP.  Clifford and Rowe feared that if farmers felt inclined to go Republican because 
of economic success, there would be little more Truman could do politically to entice farmers to 
his camp. 
The last “misfit” the Truman camp needed to secure its relationship with was the labor 
movement.  The President’s team felt less worried about organized labor voting Republican but 
did fear that too many union laborers just might not feel motivated to vote at all in 1948.34 The 
poor Democratic performance in the midterm elections of 1946 came just months after Truman 
took a hard line against labor and threatened to draft the railway strikers into the army if they 
                                                          
32 White. Whistle Stop, 163. 
33 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum. Quote found on Pg. 38-39.  
34 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  
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continued to halt transportation of the trains.35 Truman reestablished faith of many union 
supporters when he vetoed the anti-union Taft-Hartley Bill the next year and then denounced 
those Republicans who overrode his veto, but Clifford and Rowe worried now that labor was too 
“well fed” to be inspired to vote. 
The “Politics of 1948” memo detailed the realities and concerns regarding progressives, 
union workers, and farmers.  The memo also warned Truman of his biggest opponents lurking 
behind the corner such as Henry Wallace and Thomas Dewey.  If Truman drew these three key 
interest groups into his campaign, the numbers to win were on the board.  Clifford and Rowe 
then laid out for Truman the actions he needed to take in order to secure those key groups at the 
polls come November.   
In late 1947, both Rowe and Clifford believed that regardless of whatever frustrations 
Southern Democrats had with the Truman Administration and its progressive initiatives, the 
south would remain a safe Democratic stronghold.  Succeeding in the Western states, in Rowe 
and Clifford’s reasoning, needed Truman’s full attention.  If Truman captured the Western states 
that had voted for Roosevelt in the previous election along with the Southern states they believed 
were guaranteed, Truman would only be 50 electoral votes shy of the needed total.  Truman’s 
team were confident that Republicans in Congress had disappointed Westerners in their regional 
demands such as agriculture, flood prevention and relief, and land reclamation.  Rowe and 
Clifford argued that if the President keyed on such issues, taking the West was no problem. 
While Henry Wallace had not declared his intention to run as a third party contender by 
this time, preparations were underway in case he ran.  While a third party candidate likely could 
not get on all state’s ballots (making victory highly improbable), Rowe and Clifford feared that 
                                                          
35 Oral History. Dr. John R. Steelman, Special Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of War 
Mobilization and Reconversion. Feb 29, 1996. Truman Library. Online. URL; https://www.trumanlibrary.org/ 
oralhist/ steelm2b.htm. Accessed October 2017. 
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Wallace was truly eying the 1952 Democratic nomination with a strong showing in 1948 to make 
his case to the Party.  If Wallace achieved great success campaigning in 1948, the Democratic 
vote would be fractured. Truman’s team figured that the Soviet Union and the American 
Communists aspired to see Wallace split the Democratic vote.  This alleged Communist 
conspiracy believed that a victorious Republican candidate would destroy the American 
economy and bring about a class revolution in the United States.36 The issue lay in persuading 
progressives who did not align with Communism but liked Wallace’s ideals to stay with Truman 
for the general election.  It was paramount first to try to prevent Henry Wallace from running, 
while also painting a picture of him as a dangerous Communist in the event that he did run.   
Truman needed to do more than decry Wallace as Communist or a tool of the 
Communists.  He also needed to attract the young progressive base and anyone leaning towards 
independent party options for that matter.  Rowe and Clifford recognized that the traditional 
party machines of American politics had lost much of their foothold by this time.  Both Clifford 
and Rowe speculated that the fall of party machines meant that greater concern should be made 
in appealing to “pressure” groups or focus groups like farmers, union workers, and different 
ethnic and religious groups. 
The memorandum considered a strong emphasis on the farmer vote, combined with 
winning the votes out West, “Priority Number One.”  Farmers leaned to the right traditionally 
but had done well under Truman’s leadership in the Oval Office.  The Marshall Plan projected 
greater success for American farmers as well.  The only notable negative against Truman among 
farmers was the tax program. The fear was whether or not economic success would entice 
                                                          
36 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum. (Pg.4) (The concern about a Communist conspiracy for class revolution 
within Rowe and Clifford’s document reveals that even members of Truman’s administration were not immune to 
the hysteria about the Soviet Union during the early periods of the Cold War.) 
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farmers to vote Republican.  Unfortunately for Truman, there were few further initiatives that 
could be done to persuade the farming community at that point. 
With regard to the labor vote, Rowe and Clifford warned that “[i]t is dangerous to assume 
that labor now has nowhere else to go in 1948.”  The memo then underlined, “Labor can stay 
home.” This had happen in the 1946 midterms as the document reminded, and it devastated the 
Democrats.  The memorandum noted that laborers who were doing well would be “well fed” 
during the upcoming election.  This was a note of caution since labor workers voted most 
enthusiastically during struggling times. Extra effort would be required to get them to the polls.  
Truman’s veto of the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act that year did not guarantee keeping labor 
morale on his side for the next year. 
Another two important focus groups that shared similar interests were African-Americans 
and progressives.  Rowe and Clifford saw the support of northern African-Americans as 
significant in securing electoral votes in states like Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.  
African-American voters were concentrated in the urban areas of states with large electoral value, 
and were thought to vote nearly in unison.  While Truman supported extending civil rights, black 
voters knew Southern Conservative party members would do all they could to block such 
measures.  It was possible that African-Americans may try their hand at Dewey, who pushed 
New York to pass an anti-discrimination act.  Clifford and Rowe worried that Congressional 
Republicans will write up their own civil rights legislation like an anti-lynching bill and an end 
to poll taxes in order to woo black voters. The memo notes that in order to secure African-
American support, Truman should “go as far as he feels he possibly could go in recommending 
measures to protect the rights of minority groups.”  Clifford and Rowe recognized “[t]his course 
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of action would obviously cause difficulty with our Southern friends but that is the lesser of two 
evils.”37 
In the minds of the memo writers, the focus group of far left progressive was small but 
still pivotal.  The key factor of progressive support was the large number of intellectuals in that 
group.  As intellectuals, they possessed the means of communicating their support or frustration 
through writing, filmmaking, broadcasting, and other means.  Building greater support among 
progressives was significant because the large influence of Southern conservatives in the Party 
caused many progressives to lose enthusiasm for backing Democratic candidates.38   
Truman’s confrontation with Communism and the Soviet Union would also likely prove 
beneficial for the observation that “[i]n times of crisis the American citizen tends to back up his 
President.”  The memo speculated that the more confrontational things became between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, the more the public would support the Commander in Chief. 
As long as Truman assured voters that his Party did not possess Communists within it, then the 
friction with the Soviet Union should do him no harm in the election. Still, the memo noted that 
Republicans had and would continue to blame the growing influence of Moscow throughout 
Eastern Europe on policy errors from Democratic leadership and claim the Marshall Plan to be 
an ineffective waste of money. 
With an opposition led Congress during an election year Rowe and Clifford assumed that 
not only economic legislation but all legislation would be opposed ferociously by Republicans.  
                                                          
37 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum. (Pp.11-12)  
38 Along with rural farming communities, urban labor, and African-Americans and progressives, Clifford 
and Rowed emphasized that Truman should still keep in mind Jewish and Catholic groups. The Jewish vote was 
largely a matter of winning New York, a potentially nice steal from Governor Dewey.  The Palestinian region and a 
potential Jewish state there were what Jewish voters were most interested in.  Catholic voters normally sided with 
the Democrats but anxieties over the Cold War could swing their votes the other way.  Clifford and Rowe advised 
that the President should still reach out to Catholics and not rely completely on his past tough confrontations with 
Moscow. 
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The logic here was that Truman should not waste energy politicking with Congress to create bi-
partisan legislation.  They recommended that the President write up bills that appealed directly to 
the public instead of writing up bills that allowed for deal making and negotiations by both 
parties to pass. The President must appear unwavering in his support for the public needs.39  
Truman already had proven willing to be unpopular with Congress regarding Civil Rights.  
The President by this time established a Committee on Civil Rights by executive order40 and 
became the first sitting president to address the NAACP in person with a speech that, as one 
black newspaper in Kansas City wrote, was the “most forthright speech on race relations ever 
made by a President in modern times.”41 Still, with the election a significant distance away, 
Truman needed to keep swinging for greater change if he expected progressives and voters of 
color to keep faith in him. He wasted no time pushing this agenda further once the election year 
began. 
 
The Execution of the Plan 
With the strategy laid out before the starting blocks of the election year, Truman could not waste 
any time hitting his stride.  Only a week into 1948, Truman had a powerful platform in the State 
of the Union Address to begin executing the election strategy.  Truman made use of his address 
before Congress on January 7th to promote his agenda.  The President, still unannounced in his 
bid for Presidency, began his address with a positive message that set the stage for an ambitious 
campaign before hitting the issues hard. “On this occasion, above all others, the Congress and the 
President should concentrate their attention, not upon party but upon the country; not upon things 
                                                          
39 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  
40 Executive Order 9808. George M. Elsey Papers. 1948 Presidential Campaign-Civil Rights. Truman Library. 
41 “Truman’s Speech Makes History”. RG 220 Truman’s Speeches [newspaper clippings]. The Call (K.C.-
black newspaper). July 4, 1947. 
 
 
Page | 16 
which divide us but upon those which bind us together—the enduring principles of our American 
system, and our common aspirations for the future welfare and security of the people of the 
United States.”    He then made certain no one doubted that he stood for progressive change.  
He stated his concerns bluntly.  Regarding civil rights, he mentioned the stark inequalities 
that persisted in education, social mobility, discrimination at voting booths, and the overall 
security under the legal system.  “Whether discrimination is based on race, or creed, or color, or 
land of origin, it is utterly contrary to American ideals of democracy.” Truman then spoke of 
progressive reforms for health, education, and housing, noting the widening gaps that further 
stretched between the financially secure and insecure.   
Later in the speech, the President addressed inflation.  Truman argued for his initiatives 
of tax reform to lessen the heavy financial bearing on the average family. Mentioning also that 
corporations had done well in recent years, Truman felt large businesses bore a greater 
responsibility in tax shares while many Americans managed through rough times. The speech 
itself was not too popular for many in the capital.  Nonetheless, at this point in his Presidency, 
Truman felt more concerned about people far beyond Washington.  With this State of the Union 
address, Truman established the foundation he needed to build a winning campaign.42   
Clifford and Rowe included in their Memo the need for Truman’s cabinet to vouch for 
their boss this election cycle.43  They stepped up and followed through by late January.  The 
Secretary of Agriculture Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Labor Louis B. Schwellenbach, and 
Administrator of the Federal Security Administration Oscar R. Ewing gathered for a panel 
discussion syndicated for national radio broadcast in late January.  The three men acknowledged 
times were rough economically but they knew which way to swing the public’s frustration. 
                                                          
42 McCullough, Truman, 586. 
43 Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  
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The economic situation as it was, Schwellenbach stated, was the fault of the Republican 
led 80th Congress.  In Schwellenbach’s view, the 80th Congress’ initiatives for price decontrol 
saw wages fall behind and not keep up with the market.  This laid the path to sell the President’s 
progressive anti-inflation program that included “restraints upon business and consumer credit, 
and commodity speculation”.  The administration’s initiatives for price and rent control to help 
the common individual, noted the Secretary of Labor, against the private interests of the 
Republican-charged Congress.   
Ewing, in his role heading the Federal Security Administration, injected his firsthand 
account that Truman desired to improve health standards in the country.  Truman regarded health 
as a matter of national security and wanted in place a “national health insurance program” to 
assure higher standards for the sake of national security.44  Truman saw the campaign for 
healthcare to be a prominent concern for both national security and civil rights as non-white 
Americans fared worse in numbers affected by disease and death.  Progressive healthcare reform 
required greater availability of healthcare against both economic and racial segregation.45 
 Another prime opportunity to promote civil rights came in February 1948 after Truman 
consulted with his committee on civil rights. Once he heard the committee’s findings and 
suggestions the president went before Congress again to lay out his initiatives.  In this speech 
Truman reminded everyone of the values of equality aspired by the Declaration of Independence 
and noted that he felt the generation he resided in boasted the greatest claim to fulfilling those 
values.  “Unfortunately,” he continued, “there are still examples-flagrant examples--of 
discrimination which are utterly contrary to our ideals.” Noting how he saw discrimination still 
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affecting the lives of many Americans he offered the objectives he believed Congress needed to 
address.  The President wanted the Committee on Civil Rights to be a permanent body, not just 
one that came, gave its story, and dissolved out of the public’s awareness.  He also wanted civil 
rights bodies in Congress and the Department of Justice.  He desired to increase the power of the 
civil rights initiatives already in effect and secure the voting rights of all Americans stronger than 
ever.  He stated that employers should not go unchallenged when racially biased and called for 
true action against the horror of lynching. He even went as far in this period just after World War 
II to call for amendments for Japanese-Americans held in internment camps during the war.46 
 Southern Democrats were appalled. Truman understood that when he spoke of civil rights, 
Southern Democrats knew he intended to follow through on what he said.47  Truman wanted to 
stay of above the fray of sparring with his southern colleagues. When a news reporter asked the 
President a few days after the address how he thought of their disapproval, the President stated, 
“The comments are being made in the press itself and over the radio.  I have no comment.”48  
Later that month when the press asked Truman whether he planned to meet with the leaders of 
the Southern resistance, the President stated brief and clearly, “No, I do not.”  Truman offered no 
life line to anyone in the South that wanted him to turn back the clock on civil rights.49 
 The Truman campaign team felt that the president could not wait until the official 
campaign to begin for him to interact with public across the country.  He needed to get a feel for 
the political climate of the country, especially in the West, which James Rowe feared might be 
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drifting to the Republican Party in some areas.  Truman’s team needed a good excuse to travel to 
the opposite coast before his campaign began.  That opportunity came in early summer.  In June 
the Undersecretary of the Interior, Oscar Chapman, reached out to the President of the University 
of California Berkeley and persuaded him to receive President Truman as the commencement 
speaker that year.  This gave an opportunity for Truman to travel through and interact with the 
key Western states that he needed to carry in the upcoming election.50  Truman quipped his 
Western swing as a “nonpartisan, bipartisan trip”, and he did so humorously, enjoying the clearly 
unconvincing façade of this tour being “non-political”.  Making many stops along the way 
Truman assailed the 80th Congress for standing in the way of progressive initiatives to fight the 
rising costs of living for the common American.  Vouching for a new Congress this election 
Truman stated he wanted one “that will work in the interests of the common people, and not in 
the interests of the men who have all the money.”51 
 Once Truman reached Omaha, Nebraska, the president prepared his pitch to farm country, 
while a festival awaited him.52  The festival was not simply because the president was coming to 
town; the reason was more sentimental than that.  During the First World War Truman held the 
rank of captain for Battery D in the 35th Division,53  and June 5th set the day that the 35th would 
have their reunion in Omaha.54  The afternoon began well for Truman.  He and the men he led in 
World War I marched gallantly down the parade route as a large crowd cheered on each side of 
the street.  The president look as confident and revered as ever.55  The image of the underdog 
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president that day seemed certain to appear positive and uplifting, until a communication mishap 
occurred before Truman gave his speech geared to the farmers of the region. 
 When Truman arrived later in the evening to give his speech, over four-fifths of the 
seating in the 10,000-seat coliseum remained bare and vacant.  The local press never reported 
that this speech Truman was about to give was a public event, and an impression throughout the 
city was that the evening event was only for the old 35th Division itself.  The low turnout served 
as golden material for the national media to embarrass the president.  Nonetheless, Truman did 
not let the mishap phase him and instead set his sights on his mission to the farmers.  When an 
army comrade and co-chair to this event, Ed Mckim, apologized Truman for the gaffe, Truman 
responded, “Eddie, I don’t give a damn whether there’s nobody there but you and me.  I am 
making a speech on the radio to the farmers… [t]hey’re the ones I’m going to talk to.”56 
 To the farmers that did listen on the radio, the president made known that he knew their 
background, sharing his own recollection of farming with his brother.  He reminded them of the 
economic struggles that farmers experienced after the First World War and commented that the 
national failure to raise the agriculture industry out of this hardship ultimately served as the 
kindling for the Great Depression.  After the Great Depression remark Truman found himself set 
up for his rallying call, “We can’t let that happen again, and if I have anything to do with it, it 
won’t happen again!”  Referring to recovery efforts since then between farmers and the federal 
government, Truman stated that the country currently resided in “the rebirth of American 
agriculture”, due in large part of the legislative efforts put in place by Democratic 
Administrations since 1932.   
Despite record highs in income and bank deposits and savings for farmers, complemented 
with a 25 percent drop in mortgage debt in the last seven years, Truman exclaimed that this did 
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not mean that farmers and the government could relax.57  The President remembered Clifford 
and Rowe’s fear that if farmers felt economically content, the party could lose them.58  Truman 
exclaimed that the path to recovery still lay unfinished.  Many agricultural families still lived 
with substandard housing, healthcare, and schools, as well as poor infrastructure.  Preaching that 
he would call on Congress to initiate price support programs for farmers to follow the end of the 
wartime price programs Truman reaffirmed he would not let farmers again find themselves in the 
same situation they had after the First World War, but instead continue to address and tackle 
issues that remained.  The President used his homegrown folksy wit when he addressed soil 
conservation, exclaiming “You know what I think?  A large part of the fertile topsoil of Iowa and 
Nebraska and Missouri and Kansas is down at the mouth of the Mississippi River trying to make 
another county for Louisiana, and we mustn’t let that keep up!”  Truman offered his initiatives to 
continue his fight for farmers, including securing farming markets and enhancing distribution 
methods of produce.   The president reminded his audience that he had offered all these 
proposals to the 80th Congress, and Congress had shot them down.59 
By June 12th Truman shifted the aim of his message to matters on progressives’ minds. 
His trip finally reached the University of California at Berkeley and while civil rights remained a 
prime issue for progressives, resolving tense relations with the Soviet Union stood as another 
major concern.  When the president gave the commencement address, he stressed both the 
United States’ and his own personal desire as president for rational cooperation with the Soviet 
Union during this time.  He noted that “[l]ong before the war the United States established 
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normal diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union”, relieving anyone who 
doubted whether the United States could “get along with a nation whose economic and political 
system differs sharply.”  Playing the United States as cooperative for a peaceful reconstruction of 
world affairs, Truman pushed the scale of guilt on the Soviet end.  “We [the United States] have 
no hostile or aggressive designs against the Soviet Union or any other country. We are not 
waging a ‘cold war’…The cleavage that exists is not between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. It is between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.” He reiterated the moral image 
that the U.S. wanted to work as companions with Moscow and was “devoted to the principle of 
discussion and negotiation in settling international differences.”  This speech allowed Truman to 
appear rationale and cooperative as a world leader while maintaining a stiff stance against 
“obstruction and aggression” from a foreign power.60 
 
A Spectacle at the Democratic National Convention 
When the Democratic National Convention gathered in mid-July civil rights loomed anxiously 
over the delegates.  A new civil rights plank proposed by progressive members of the 
convention’s platform committee faced rejection by their colleagues.  Instead the civil rights 
plank adopted contained language unclear of any direct measures and kept many Southern 
delegates at ease.  That progressive element remained determined and figured that if greater civil 
rights are not openly fought for by the Party at the convention, it would persuade more 
progressive Democrats to back Henry Wallace.61  Those who called for a more assertive message 
on civil rights found their pinnacle moment during the speech of Minneapolis mayor Hubert 
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Humphrey.  Humphrey’s speech claimed that the United States was “172 years too late” on the 
matter of civil rights and delivered a direct blow to the South when he chimed that the 
Democratic Party and the country must "get out of the shadow of states’ rights and walk 
forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights.”62 
 After the speech the progressives in the party returned their version of the civil rights 
plank up to the stage for a vote by the entire convention.  It passed although highly contested.  
Many southern delegates felt that this was the final straw.  During the tally to officially declare 
the Democratic Nominee, Alabama delegate Leven Ellis announced his strong disapproval of the 
civil rights measure and proclaimed “we bid you good-bye” as 13 members of the Alabama 
delegation marched out of the Democratic National Convention, followed by the Mississippi 
delegates who shouted “Good-bye Harry!”63 
 Truman, who witnessed Humphrey’s speech televised, was taken aback by the assertive 
rhetoric on civil rights that Humphrey gave in his speech.  He worried if it jeopardized too many 
Southern voters64, and in fact it did.  Several days later, 6,000 Southerners rallied in Birmingham 
with members of the convention walkout among them.  The rally was the State’s Rights 
Democratic Convention and Strom Thurmond officially accepted their nomination for President.  
Fortunately for Truman, not all prominent Southern Democrats, like Richard Russell of Georgia 
and Harry Byrd of Virginia, abandoned him.65  Regardless, Clifford and Rowe’s assumption that 
the South remained a safe Democratic stronghold collapsed with one grand spectacle at the DNC. 
After the Southern revolt, Truman’s persona before his acceptance speech appeared as 
wounded and beleaguered as ever.  Truman defied the negative momentum.  Truman had before 
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him at the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia a pivotal opportunity to show 
himself ready and eager to fight for his key interest groups.  Here he must reinforce the 
objectives of his strategy in one monumental speech before one large assembly with radio 
broadcasts reaching living rooms across the nation.  While Truman’s chance to speak came 
around 2 o’clock in the morning of the convention’s last sweltering hot day, Truman would not 
waste this key opportunity.  After Truman accepted the nomination of his Party, he then 
bellowed defiantly to anyone who doubted him, “Senator Barkley and I will win this election, 
and make these Republicans like it--don’t you forget that!”  He soon thereafter gave the rallying 
cry, “Now it’s time for us to get together and beat the common enemy!”  The President now put 
the audience into a loud frenzy. 
With the crowd enthused, Truman directly reached out to two key interests groups he 
needed; farmers and labor.  With regard to farmers, the president boasted that their income 
increased by over $16 billion under 16 years of Democratic leadership.  His followed this 
impressive statistic with a stiff and blunt message, “Never in the world were the farmers of any 
republic or any kingdom or any other country as prosperous as the farmers of the United States; 
and if they don’t do their duty by the Democratic Party, they are the most ungrateful people in 
the world!” 
Appealing to organized labor, Truman used the same formula.  He mentioned the large 
increase recorded for wages and salaries under Democratic Administrations, in this case a $99 
billion uptake, and then echoed his call on labor strictly, “And I say to labor what I have said to 
the farmers: they are the most ungrateful people in the world if they pass the Democratic Party 
by this year.”  The president needed support of these two critical groups of farmers and laborers, 
but he also knew he needed to stand before those groups as a leader staunch in his call for loyalty. 
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He then recognized other accomplishments of the past Democratic Administrations since 
Wilson, from national income to foreign policy, including Truman’s own Marshall Plan.  The 
President countered his party’s record with that of his Republican opponents.  He made certain to 
throw the weight of negative attention onto the opposition led Congress, as stressed from a 
cardinal rule from the Clifford-Rowe Memorandum.  The president spared no feelings in his 
critiques.  He stated, “Ever since its inception, that [Republican] party has been under the control 
of special privilege; and they have completely proved it in the 80th Congress…They proved it by 
the things they failed to do.  Now, let’s look at some of them--just a few.”  Truman’s list 
included the Republican Congress’ overly long efforts to figure a bill to extend price controls. 
Truman claimed he was cornered into signing their last effort, “because they quit and went home” 
at that point.  He pointed the finger at the 80th Congress for a long list of issues.  The list 
included: Rising inflation, neglecting to combat poverty, failure to come to a quick and effective 
solution on the housing crisis, hurting blue-collar workers with the Taft-Hartley Act, shutting 
down a proposal to raise minimum wage, ignoring education funding needs, healthcare needs, 
and eliminating 750,000 citizens from social security benefits.   
The president also ridiculed the Republican majority 80th Congress for ignoring the civil 
rights program the president outlined.  This set Truman up to rally his final interest group, 
progressives.  Truman pledged he sought civil rights initiatives “because I believed it to be my 
duty under the Constitution.”  Truman acknowledged that there were members of his own Party 
that disliked his civil rights measures but concluded that at least, “they stand up and do it openly!  
People can tell where they stand.”  He wanted to keep the focus of frustration for failed 
initiatives on the folks across the aisle.  Truman attacked, “But the Republicans all professed to 
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be for these measures.  But Congress failed to act… [Republicans] had enough people in that 
Congress that would vote for cloture.”    
President Truman by this point in his acceptance speech reiterated his consideration and 
concern for the key interest groups he focused on, farmers, labor, and progressives.  He 
hammered the 80th Congress for their stubbornness as the cause of the country’s problems and 
presented himself as the embattled fighter who would never give up his campaign for the 
common American. Now Truman lashed out one last swing to put his opponents on their heels 
and prove himself ready for another round of bouts.  Truman proclaimed, “My duty as President 
requires that I use every means within my power to get the laws the people need on matters of 
such importance and urgency.  I am therefore calling this Congress back into session on the 26th 
of July!”  The Convention Hall roared in cheers and applause for the next 30 seconds.  Truman 
struggled to calm them down to finish his speech.  Once the crowd allowed their nominee to 
continue, Truman recalled a line that his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, gave in his first 
acceptance speech for the Democratic Nomination in 1932: “‘[t]his is more than a political call 
to arms.  Give me your help, not to win votes alone, but to win in this new crusade to keep 
America secure and safe for its own people.”’   
 
Whistle Stop Tour 
During the “non-political” tour earlier that year in which Truman assailed the 80th Congress 
mercilessly, Republican Senator Robert Taft retaliated with a quip, “The President is 
blackguarding the Congress at every whistle stop in the country.”  The term “whistle stop” 
referred to towns so small they were almost irrelevant on the public’s conscience.66  The slight 
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became symbolic for Truman’s campaign.  In September after Truman secured the Democratic 
nod, he charged the “Whistle Stop Tour” through key regions of the country that the President 
needed in order to catch up to the Governor of New York.67  
  Labor Day provided the ideal opportunity for Truman to reach out to the organized labor 
voters that the Clifford-Rowe Memo highlighted.  That day over 100,000 spectators crowded 
into Cadillac Square in Detroit to see the President speak.68  Near Truman were Frank Martel, 
President of the Detroit Federation of Labor, and Walter Reuther, President of the United 
Automobile Workers. Prominent in the crowd were members of the major labor unions, the 
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.  Truman understood 
that blue collar workers wanted a straight talker as their president, and he remembered Clifford 
and Rowe’s advice that laborers needed to be concerned about the future, rather than satisfied 
about today, in order to come out in large numbers in November.  With a slight jest early in the 
address that gracefully flowed into sobering awareness, Truman remarked, “as you know, I speak 
plainly sometimes.  In fact, I speak bluntly sometimes.  I am going to speak plain and bluntly 
today. These are critical times for labor and for all who work.  There is great danger ahead.”  
Truman placed that looming danger on the Republican Party’s philosophy towards the market.  
Since the turn of the century the President concluded, Republican control of the economy had let 
laborers down during several critical periods, spanning from the economic woes of 1907 and 
1908 to the recent Great Depression.   
This opened the door for Truman to continue his attack on the current Congress.  “That 
80th Republican Congress failed to crack down on prices but it cracked down on labor all right!”  
Truman recalled the damage that the Taft-Hartley caused to labor unions and reminded that it 
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only went through because that opposition body overrode his veto of it.  With the blunt delivery 
he promised, Truman reiterated that doom laid ahead if labor did not act; “I know that the Taft-
Hartley law is only a foretaste of what you will get if the Republican reaction is allowed to 
continue to grow…[a]nd if you stay at home, as you did in 1946, and keep these reactionaries in 
power, you will deserve every blow you get!”  Truman rallied to the crowd, “I tell you that labor 
must fight now harder than ever before to make sure that its rights are kept intact.”69 
The ambition to win over the farmer found prime opportunity at the National Plowing 
Match in Dexter, Iowa on September 18.  Clifford and Rowe already worried that economic 
prosperity might persuade many farmers to vote Republican.70  Iowa previously demonstrated 
this possibility.   Dewey had won Iowa against Roosevelt in 1944.  In fact, Iowa during this time 
bore practically no allegiance to Democrats as the governor, and its eight congressmen and two 
senators in Washington were all Republican.  The President remained optimistic nonetheless as 
he recalled that the state’s farmers overwhelmingly backed Roosevelt and the Democrats during 
the Great Depression.71   In this speech before 80,000 spectators within a deeply Republican state, 
Truman hammered away at the Republicans nearly the entire time.  
Truman addressed the crowd first with praise for “the record-breaking harvests” and 
declared that the vast supply of food that farmers offer the world “are helping to save the world 
from communism.”  Similar to his appeal to union workers, Truman underscored the hard times 
that the farming communities had experienced under Republican Administrations, notably 
Hoover and the Great Depression, and the recovery found under Democratic Administrations, 
notably with Roosevelt.  Truman followed the cardinal rule laid down by the Clifford-Rowe 
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Memo and swung more blows at the “do-nothing” 80th Congress.  He stated memorably, “This 
Republican Congress has already stuck a pitchfork in the farmer’s back” and noted that wheat 
prices, for instance, dropped under that Congress’ alterations to price supports.72  Truman’s 
grandstanding blows to Congress reaped replies of “Give ‘em hell, Harry!” from the crowd.73  
The President and his team noted the wealthy harvest of crops that awaited in the fall on their 
voyage to the Midwest,74 and Truman knew he needed to bash his Congressional opponents for 
cutting government sponsored storage bins.  He portrayed the Republicans in Congress as the 
puppets of the “Wall Street economic dictatorship” that are on course to “let prices crash to the 
bottom.”  He championed Democrats as the party “planning to aid the farmers of America” in the 
“farmer’s battle.”  Truman portrayed himself at the end of his overwhelmingly biting speech as a 
humble crusader concerned for the common good. The President remarked, “I’m not asking you 
just to vote for me.  Vote for yourselves!  Vote for your farms...and vote for your future!” 
  The Democratic National Committee during the election cycle established a Research 
Division that gathered specific facts and details about each “whistle stop” they arrived at.  This 
allowed the President to construct a unique and relevant speech to give to each community.75 
Such detailed research helped execute Clifford and Rowe’s strategy of reaching out to the rural 
farming communities.  In Oxford, Iowa, the President knew that the town commonly yielded 100 
bushels of corn to an acre, and unlike the rest of the state during this period, voted Democratic 
since the Civil War.  The preparation notes for Truman’s speech there included a warming jest, 
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“Now I’d just like to say that people who can grow 100 bushels of corn to an acre—and raise 
more hogs than anybody else in the whole country—and vote Democratic—they are really smart 
people.”76  In Price, Utah, Truman knew ahead of his speech to praise the Fish and Wildlife 
Service of the community because it protected “one million dollars’ worth of lambs” from 
predators.77  In October in Crawfordsville, Indiana he mentioned his joy in being in “the 
hometown of General Lew Wallace” and mentioned that earlier he visited nearby Greenfield, the 
hometown of poet James Whitcomb Riley.78   
Truman’s specific speeches to each small community contrasted sharply with his 
opponent Thomas Dewey.  Dewey’s speeches came across as ambiguous and uninspiring.79 One 
editor noted that Dewey’s speeches possessed predominantly “pleasant-sounding generalities.”80 
A speech by Dewey in Kentucky provided an example of generalities in Dewey’s speech that 
contrasted to Truman’s speeches.  Dewey’s particular speech drew out the message of peace 
redundantly.  He began, “The most important job that faces the American nation today is to 
create a lasting peace…There must be peace with justice in the world.  We must wage peace with 
all the skill and courage and determination with which we waged and won the war.”  The speech 
continued and ended on virtually the same vague message, “we shall pray for peace and we shall 
work for peace with a strength and competence we have so long and so desperately needed.  It is 
an endeavor to which I am pledged.  With the cooperation and the determination of all 
Americans, this endeavor cannot fail.  Strong and united, we shall wage the peace together.”81  
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The efforts of the DNC’s Research Division to appeal to rural and predominantly farming 
communities, as stressed in the Clifford-Rowe Memo, produced an image of Truman as more 
interested in the lives of average Americans versus Thomas Dewey.  Reporters like The New 
York Daily News’ Charles Green noted easily the contrast in reception between the Truman and 
Dewey crowds.82 
 As Truman made his way westward, he extended his effort to reach out to progressive 
voters, the third interest group he needed to secure.  Truman already made clear back in late July 
that he meant to follow through on his progressive rhetoric.  On July 26th, Truman signed to 
prominent executive orders over the issue of civil rights.  The first, Executive Order 9980, 
required fair employment in federal jobs regardless of race, creed, or national origin.83  The 
following Executive Order brought an end to discrimination in the military.84  
Now back in California, Truman spoke at Gilmore Stadium in Los Angeles.  Truman 
described the Democratic Party as the Party of “Four Freedoms: Freedom from Want; Freedom 
from Fear; Freedom of Worship; and Freedom of Speech,” while his Republican opponents stood 
for “big business first.”  Truman rallied off the progressive accomplishments of his Party in the 
last decade and a half including “social security; the farm program; collective bargaining; the 
minimum wage law…low rent housing; soil conservation, reclamation and irrigation projects; 
[and] full employment.”   After the President attacked the Republican Congress for their neglect 
with his initiatives to increase school funding and fight inflation, he acknowledged that they 
were liberals in the country convinced of a third party alternative.  A hint at Wallace and his 
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campaign of course.  Truman replied bluntly, “To these liberals I would say in all sincerity: 
Think again.”  Truman adhered to the Memorandum’s recommendation that Wallace should be 
portrayed as a Communist puppet.  The President stated, “The fact that the Communists are 
guiding and using the third party shows that this party does not represent American ideals.”  
Truman then followed with the “wasted vote cliché” to anyone still not convinced, “The third 
party has no power in the Government” and therefore “cannot achieve peace…cannot achieve 
better conditions here at home, because it is powerless.”  “The Democratic Party is the party 
which truly expresses the hopes of American liberals”, the President added, “and which has 
power to fulfill those hopes.”85   
 Truman’s speeches in Detroit and Los Angeles revealed his undertaking to persuade 
progressive minded and labor union voters as advised in the “Politics of 1948” Memorandum 
composed by James Rowe and Clark Clifford.  The President’s speech in Dexter, Iowa as well as 
his specifically designed speeches at each whistle stop, revealed his ability to follow the Memo’s 
advice to court the farmer vote.  Throughout all his speeches Truman followed the judgement of 
Clifford and Rowe to hit the Republican led 80th Congress on issues important to Americans.  
Election night on November 2nd put the Memo and Truman’s political savvy to the test. 
 
The Election and the Outcome 
On election night Truman wanted to escape the crowd and find a quiet peaceful place to compose 
himself after the long and strenuous effort.  Truman with the help of his aides slipped into a hotel 
room in Excelsior Springs.  The head of the secret service resided that night at the Roosevelt 
Hotel in New York where Dewey stayed, convinced that Dewey would be his new boss.  Truman 
                                                          
85 Address at the Gilmore Stadium in Los Angeles.  Sep 23, 1948. 205. Public Papers. Harry S. Truman 
1945-1953. Truman Library. Online. URL; https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1955. 
Accessed November 2017. 
 
 
Page | 33 
ate a small meal and listened to early results on the radio. By eight o’clock that night Truman 
carried the popular vote, but Dewey took electoral strongholds like Pennsylvania and New 
York.86  By nine o’clock Truman decided to shut off the radio, turn off the lights, and go to sleep.  
At four a.m. the President awoke to the light jolting of a secret service agent.  “We’ve won,” 
exclaimed the agent.   
 The result was official a few hours later that morning.87  Truman with 28 states held 303 
electoral votes, Dewey won 16 states for 189 electoral votes, Thurmond carried 4 states for 39 
electoral votes, and Wallace’s campaign fizzled to carry no states. The electoral map showed 
undoubtedly that Clifford and Rowe’s “number one priority” to gain the Western states came 
through in Truman’s campaign.  Every state west of the Dakotas, save Oregon, went for the 
President.  That in itself totaled 65 electoral votes.88  The Memo regarded Western states as a 
progressive region and Truman met their demands in action as well as in his campaign speeches. 
Truman’s executive orders to end discrimination in federal careers and in the military, solidified 
his commitment to progressives in the West and elsewhere.  It also spelled doom for Wallace’s 
chances to appear as a credible third option candidate to Truman.   
The interest group of farmers that Clifford and Rowe believed to be so pivotal to the 
election largely backed Truman also.  Iowa exhibited a key example of Truman’s push to win 
farmers.  As noted earlier Iowa sided predominantly Republican before the 1948 election.   All of 
Iowa’s 10 representatives in Washington and its governor were Republican, plus the state backed 
the Republican Dewey in his bid for the White House in 1944.  In 1948 Iowa backed a Democrat 
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again for the White House.  The most populated Midwestern states around Iowa, such as 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Missouri backed Truman as well.   
While the West and much of the farm strong Midwest went for Truman, the fallout from 
the Democratic National Convention assured that the South would not be “safely Democratic”.89 
Nonetheless Truman handled the brunt of the Thurmond’s Dixiecrat challenge well in the South. 
Thurmond took his own state of Alabama along with Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
one electoral vote from a faithless elector in Tennessee.  Truman still managed to win notable 
southern states like Texas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and the other 11 electoral votes of 
Tennessee.90 
The third interest group that Truman needed to influence, according to Clifford and Rowe 
were union laborers.  Truman’s vigorous appeal to laborers received respect and high praise that 
election year.  “Our Laboristic President” described Truman on a Fortune cover story for the 
candidate that earned the support of nearly nine out of 10 auto factory workers.  Overall laborers 
came out in powerful numbers91 to the relief of Clifford and Rowe who earlier stressed to the 
President, “Labor can stay home.”92  The President’s push for labor demands along with his 
relentless assault on Republicans in Congress produced a positive dual affect for both Truman 
himself and Congressional Democrats.  The Democratic Party reversed their disastrous tide in 
1946 and regained the majority of seats in Congress.93  Nearly all of the House and Senate 
Democrats that defeated an incumbent Republican carried a strong backing by labor unions.  The 
American Federation of Labor saw 14 of the 16 Senate candidates it supported win their 
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elections while over four-fifths of the House candidates it endorsed won.94  Two new members to 
the Senate that election, Minnesota’s Hubert Humphrey, and Illinois’ Paul Douglas, would carry 
on the legacy of Truman’s political theories for future generations in the Senate95 while a third 
new elected member of the Senate that year, Lyndon Johnson, carried those political theories into 
the White House again.96 Truman came away after the election not just with the title of President 
on his own right but with a Congress politically aligned with his philosophy and fine-tuned to 
create a lasting impact.   
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Electoral Map of the 1948 Presidential Election 
 
 
 
 
Source: Time Magazine. Online. http://time.com/4561347/presidential-election-results-
interactive/ (Thurmond won one electoral vote in Tennessee by an elector that defected from the 
popular vote of that state.) 
 
 
 
 
